Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim’s administration has witnessed an era of recalibrated federal relations with Sarawak and Sabah.
His commitment to the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63) has been widely seen as a strategic move, given the critical parliamentary support we contribute to his one-time fledgling Pakatan Harapan coalition.
However, Anwar’s concessions to East Malaysia, viewed by his own colleagues and other Malayan leaders as excessive, could face resistance in a future federal landscape.
When PMX eventually exits the political stage, questions loom over whether his successors will maintain the same level of cooperation and autonomy for East Malaysia or revert to a more centralised approach.
I will explore the current dynamic, critical issues at stake, and possible scenarios for Sarawak and Sabah in a post-Anwar era.
Since taking office, Anwar has actively engaged East Malaysian leaders, establishing the MA63 committee chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Fadillah Yusof.
These moves signal a marked shift from previous administrations, positioning us not merely as two of Malaysia’s 13 states but as integral, autonomous partners.
Anwar’s overtures are important because our political support bolsters the unity government and prevents destabilising challenges.
With 56 MPs from East Malaysia (Sarawak alone contributes 31) forming a significant bloc in his government, Anwar’s strategy has been to negotiate and, where possible, fulfil MA63 demands.
Unlike his predecessors who could rely on a Malayan majority, Anwar’s coalition has little choice but to cater to the East Malaysian agenda to maintain political stability. In effect, we have emerged as ‘kingmakers’, wielding influence as a check on federal policies.
Key issues in federal-East Malaysia ties
A cornerstone of our demands is the right to oil and gas reserves off Sarawak and Sabah coasts. The 1974 Petronas Development Act (PDA) granted Putrajaya full ownership of these resources, but Sarawak and Sabah argue that MA63 and pre-existing British colonial delineations affirm their rights to these continental shelves.
Given the economic weight of Petronas, which funds roughly 20 per cent of Malaysia’s development budget, any major shift towards East Malaysia’s control over resources would disrupt the nation’s financial equilibrium.
Thus, future administrations may resist these demands, prioritising the country’s fiscal needs over regional autonomy.
MA63 originally provided for one-third parliamentary representation for Sarawak, Sabah and Singapore, meant as a safeguard against total dominance by Malaya.
Following Singapore’s expulsion in 1965, however, this representation was never adjusted, leaving us with a reduced share of seats in Parliament.
Sarawak has since sought to restore its representation, which would require a constitutional amendment. While Anwar’s government has remained open to the dialogue, any successor might lack his willingness to pursue the politically sensitive changes needed to ensure equal representation.
Thus the reason why Anwar should speed up the decision to give Sarawak and Sabah each the one-third parliamentary representation.
Sabah’s demand for a 40 per cent revenue entitlement from federal tax collected in the state is another unresolved issue.
Federal control over revenue distribution has often left Sabah’s leaders politically weakened, but with Anwar’s support, there has been a revived push for settlement.
However, the financial stakes are high, with estimates placing the arrears at around RM20 billion.
An incoming administration less reliant on East Malaysia’s support could view this demand as excessive and deprioritise it, leaving Sabah’s entitlement unaddressed for years to come.
Uncertain future post-Anwar
Anwar’s government, motivated by the precarious balance of power, is committed to our demands as a political necessity. A future leader with a different support base, however, might not feel the same compulsion.
Leaders motivated by nationalist agendas may adopt a more Malayan-centric approach, sidelining our concerns in favour of uniform policies across the federation.
The legacy of centralised governance has historically marginalised East Malaysia’s interests.
A less accommodating future administration might justify centralisation under the guise of national unity, risking a return to the ‘fixed deposit’ mentality that Anwar’s administration is working to dismantle.
If this occurs, our trust in Putrajaya could be eroded, with lasting consequences for national cohesion.
A best-case scenario would see future governments uphold MA63, honouring East Malaysian autonomy and recognising our equal partnership in the federation.
However, this would require leaders with a deep commitment to federalism, an understanding of Malaya’s distinct identity, and a long-term view of national unity.
Such leaders are rare, and their policies may face resistance from Malayan-focused constituents and lawmakers.
Alternatively, a Malayan-centric government could resist further devolution, possibly reversing some of the gains achieved under the Madani administration.
This scenario could trigger political discontent, with East Malaysian leaders resorting to legal and political channels to secure autonomy, risking prolonged standoffs and inefficiencies in governance.
If successive administrations fail to address our concerns adequately, both Sarawak and Sabah could intensify calls for greater autonomy, even raising quasi-independence rhetoric.
While secession remains highly improbable, given the lack of infrastructure for independent statehood, greater autonomy within Malaysia could be achievable if backed by sustained East Malaysian political will.
Malayan interests
Within Malaya, some political factions view our demands sceptically, fearing an erosion of national unity and a drain on federal resources.
Leaders who view these issues through a nationalist lens may be disinclined to appease our demands. Should such voices gain influence post-Anwar, we could see a roll-back on promised MA63 provisions and a further centralisation of power.
Petronas’s revenue forms a major portion of the national budget, and any future administration could face pressure from Malayan states dependent on these funds.
Such pressure could delay or limit our control over our resources, creating economic constraints and forcing us into prolonged negotiations.
MA63 as a legal tool
For Sarawak and Sabah, MA63 serves as a historical and legal foundation to assert our demands. Post-Anwar, our leaders could increasingly turn to legal avenues to enforce MA63 provisions, hoping to secure resource rights and representation without relying on federal goodwill.
Judicial victories would grant us a firmer hand in negotiations, potentially reshaping federalism in Malaysia.
East Malaysia’s political bloc will retain its importance for future federal stability. However, without Anwar’s inclusive approach, Sarawak’s leverage could be limited to bargaining for symbolic roles or concessions that fall short of genuine autonomy.
While Anwar’s administration has opened doors for our MA63 demands, the sustainability of these gains remains uncertain.
A more centralised or Malayan-focused future government may seek to reassert control, possibly ‘bulldozing’ Sarawak’s current progress if politically expedient.
The two states, especially Sarawak, must strategically prepare for these potential shifts by strengthening alliances, cultivating legal recourse, and advocating for constitutional protections that enshrine their autonomy.
For us, the path forward requires vigilance, strategic foresight, and a continued assertion of our unique role within Malaysia.
Only by safeguarding these advances can we ensure a lasting recognition as equal partners in the Malaysian federation.
The views expressed here are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the views of New Sarawak Tribune.
